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Abstract
In this paper we present compelling evidence from a detailed analysis of
historical prepayment data to demonstrate that a mortgage cohort remem-
bers the level of the previous mortgage rate troughs experienced by the co-
hort. This is a general property, observed ubiquitously, that inescapably leads
to refinancing models with a continuous distribution of refinancing incentive
thresholds (elbows). We present such a new refinancing model, derived from
the first principle, based on a single assumption that each loan has an in-
centive threshold above which its borrower will refinance. In this model, the
refinancing prepayment of a cohort is a dynamic self-selection process that
evolves by itself according to the encountered mortgage rate environment
with the cohort concurrently acquiring its memory along the way.
∗Current address: Model Review & Oversight, Fannie Mae, 3900 Wisconsin Ave. NW, Washing-
ton, DC 20016-2892. Email: junwu gan@fanniemae.com
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I. INTRODUCTION
A mortgage prepayment model is supposed to project prepayment speeds under any
possible future scenario of market conditions, of which the dominant factors affecting refi-
nancing prepayments are future mortgage rates. Apart from some sporadic market implied
measurements, the major source of data for model calibration comes from the historical
prepayment behavior. A major challenge, and possibly the ultimate one, is to ensure that a
model calibrated to a single historical scenario remains qualitatively correct for any possible
future scenario.
It is likely that a thorough understanding of the sufficient conditions for a qualitatively
correct prepayment model is still beyond our reach. Nevertheless, there are certain necessary
conditions that any qualitatively correct prepayment model must not violate. Beautiful
fitting of historical prepayment speeds is important. It is one important measure of the
model caliber. It is the first test a model must pass. But it is not the last test. It is far
more important to extract correct qualitative features from historical data and have them
built into the model. The difference lies in the predictive power of the model.
For a prepayment model to have the potential of possessing predictive power, it must
capture the fundamental econometric relationship [5]. The function of a prepayment model
is to predict how efficiently borrowers exercise their prepayment option when presented with
financial incentives. It is hopeful that the fundamental econometric relationship is relatively
stable in time after the effects of changing economic environment have been identified and
treated separately. For instance, changes to loan program guidelines or underwriting stan-
dards can all affect financial incentives in the eyes of borrowers making refinancing decisions.
The impact of the changing economic environment is better taken into account by comput-
ing an incentive measure that is comparable over time, leaving the core prepayment model
to capture the fundamental and hopefully stable econometric relationship.
Because future mortgage rates are unknown, the core prepayment model capturing the
econometric relationship should not be tainted by the specific shape of the historical mort-
2
gage rate curves against which the model is calibrated. In fact, the econometric relationship
should be independent of the shape of the historical mortgage rate curves! (If one wonders
whether the existence of the so-called media effect would invalidate the above argument,
please read on.) One should always check whether one would end up with a different model
if sequences, relative heights, and distances between mortgage rate peaks and troughs were
different. A blind statistical regression of the historical prepayment data against the single
scenario of the historical mortgage rates and housing prices etc. risks failing this test.
In general, newly originated mortgages should not depend on the historical mortgage
rates before their origination. Superficially, the existence of the media effect may present
a possible exception. The media effect represents the fact that when mortgage rates reach
historical lows, the prepayment speeds are likely to see an extra boost because borrowers
are bombarded by the news media about their refinancing opportunities. At any given time,
past mortgage rates are used to determine whether the current mortgage rate qualifies as a
historical low. Even in this case, the past mortgage rates only enter into the calculation of
a numeric measure for quantifying how low historically is the current mortgage rate. This
numerical measure only describes the market condition. It is independent of mortgages
themselves and their characteristics. For instance, this numerical measure is the same for
all mortgage product types. The econometric relationship for the media effect measures the
extra prepayment boost for a given numerical measure of how low historically is the mortgage
rate under consideration and generally varies with mortgage product types. For instance,
this extra boost is proportionally stronger for conforming than jumbo fixed rate mortgages
historically. After separating out the numeric measure representing the market condition,
the econometric relationship representing the media effect is independent of the historical
mortgage rates before mortgage origination. It is true that the model parameters for the
media effect would be different if a different numerical measure for the market condition were
chosen. Nevertheless, the logical separation between the econometric relation capturing the
borrowers’ response to the market condition and the numerical measure quantifying the
market condition is unambiguous.
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For seasoned mortgages, their future behavior does depend on the mortgage rates before
the current pricing date due to the well known burnout effect [4]. This dependence arises
from the loans’ exposure to those mortgage rates since origination. The model at the time
of origination of these mortgages does not depend on the historical mortgage rates before
origination.
The constraint that a prepayment model be independent of the shape of the historical
mortgage rate curves before mortgage origination is not difficult to satisfy by itself. For
example, a simple model with a monotonic dependence of the refinancing prepayment speed
on the incentive would satisfy the constraint. However, the richness of the burnout effect
makes satisfying the constraint more challenging.
The usual description of the burnout effect is that a seasoned cohort that has experi-
enced refinancing prepayments before will prepay slower in the future than a similar cohort
of newly originated mortgages. This effect was correctly attributed to the inhomogeneity
of the mortgages in the cohort [4]. Various approaches have been developed to capture the
burnout effect, from a simple depression of future refinancing prepayments by a cumulative
measure of past refinancing exposure to a continuous distribution of populations with dif-
ferent refinancing intensities [1,3,5–8]. These approaches share a common understanding of
the burnout effect that the inhomogeneity results in populations with different refinancing
amplitudes. Conceptually, these approaches are qualitatively equivalent to a two-population
mechanism of the burnout effect [4]. In this simple mechanism, a cohort is considered virtu-
ally made up of one fast prepaying population and another slow or non-prepaying population.
As the fast population is depleted, the refinancing prepayments of the cohort will be sup-
pressed. The difference between the various approaches [1,3,5–8] lies in the details in the
model flexibility to fit historical data.
One common deficiency of the above mentioned traditional approaches to the burnout ef-
fect is that the depression of the future refinancing prepayments is across the entire spectrum
of refinancing incentives. For example, one can imagine a scenario in which a cohort experi-
ences a long period of small refinancing incentives. Though the refinancing prepayments will
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be low due to the small incentives, the cohort will nevertheless be burned out after a long
period. Consequently, this burned-out cohort will not participate in future refinancing pre-
payments no matter how high future incentives will be. Experienced practitioners know that
this is not true. For instance, it is shown in Figures 10 and 11 of the reference [2] that the
effectiveness of the burnout effect decreases for lower mortgage rates: ”Even a seasoned bor-
rower would be enticed to refinance if presented with a refinancing incentive that is greater
than any that he has ever seen”. To alleviate the obvious deficiency of complete burnout
by an extended period of marginal refinancing exposure, one may introduce a curing (also
referred to as reconstitution) effect. The idea is that whatever challenging conditions that
caused slow or non-prepaying populations not participating in previous refinancing waves
are cured gradually over the time. While the economic basis for the curing effect is sound,
it is practically delicate to determine the curing rate. In a practical situation somewhat
similar to the above discussed simplistic example where a cohort exposed to a long period
of small refinancing incentives runs into a big refinancing wave, the calibrated curing effect
would likely depend on the specific shape of the historical mortgage rate curves if the curing
rate were simply chosen to produce desired refinancing peaks for the late refinancing wave.
One has to make sure that the calibrated curing rate would stay the same if the late big
refinancing wave occurred sooner or later in time, with different depth for the mortgage rate
troughs, and if the period of small refinancing incentives were shorter or longer.
When the burnout effect is treated by depressing the future refinancing amplitude across
the entire incentive spectrum, the shape of the S-curve (the refinancing response function
in terms of incentives) is suppressed vertically. Though the shape of the total S-curve for a
cohort can evolve in time in multi-population models, each population still has its own S-
curve and the depression of the future refinancing prepayments of each population is uniform
across the entire spectrum of the refinancing incentives. The presence of more populations
allows better historical fitting. But the positioning of the elbows of the fictitious inter-
mediary refinancing populations is treacherous, with the undesired side effect of oscillating
convexities. The risk of over-parameterization also undermines the predictive power of the
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model by including in the model untested sensitivities with respect to the changing shape
of the mortgage rate curves.
The difficulties of the traditional treatments of the burnout effect can be traced back
to the conceptual misunderstanding of the inhomogeneity resulting in different refinanc-
ing amplitudes. In the next section and Appendix A, we shall present a detailed analysis of
historical prepayment data to demonstrate unambiguously that the consequence of the inho-
mogeneity is a distribution of refinancing incentive thresholds (elbows), not the refinancing
amplitudes. The misunderstanding of the role of the inhomogeneity not only caused practi-
cal difficulties but also lead to qualitatively incorrect answers about when higher incentives
can correspond to lower refinancing prepayments.
The specific fact we shall establish through the analysis of the next section and Ap-
pendix A is that a mortgage cohort with past refinancing exposure remembers the level of
previous mortgage rate troughs. The future behavior of the cohorts will be different, de-
pending on whether or not future mortgage rates will fall below the previous lows. Since
future mortgage rates are unknown, a cohort of newly originated mortgages can experience
multiple periods of different refinancing incentives. The first trough of the future mortgage
rates can be at any level and the cohort can remember that level. Therefore, a refinancing
prepayment model mus be able to remember any mortgage rate value. A refinancing model
that can remember any mortgage rate value must have a continuous distribution of refi-
nancing incentive thresholds. It is true that mortgages with different refinancing incentive
thresholds generally have different refinancing amplitudes. But the different amplitudes are
the manifested consequence, not the cause.
When prepayment speeds are differentiated by more and more loan-level attributes and
when a pool-level cohort is split into loan-level cohorts, how does the burnout effect evolve?
For example, a cohort of fixed rate mortgages with pool-level characteristics in the traditional
sense of agency pools has only two indicatives, i.e. the average coupon and origination date.
The loan-level attributes, such as loan size, loan-to-value, credit score, geological location
and documentation level etc., are all considered part of the mortgage inhomogeneity of the
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pool-level cohort. When these attributes are pulled out of the inhomogeneity, it is hard to
imagine that the distribution of the refinancing elbows due to the inhomogeneity will stay
unchanged. Indeed, historical evidence presented in Section VI will show that some loan-
level attributes such as loan size and loan-to-value do interact with the burnout effect. The
new refinancing model with a continuous distribution of elbows provides a natural framework
to treat the evolution of the burnout effect from pool-level to loan-level cohorts.
It is clear from the above discussions that a prepayment model must satisfy at least
two constraints. First, the validity of the econometric relationship of the model should not
be constrained to the historical scenario of market conditions against which the model is
calibrated. Especially, the econometric relationship should not be tainted by the particular
shape of the historical mortgage rate curves. A mortgage cohort simply evolves from origi-
nation according to whatever scenario of the market conditions encountered by the cohort.
The model has no preferential scenario. It just happens that for the historical scenario of
the market conditions, the model generates projections close to the actual prepayments.
Secondly, as the cohort becomes seasoned, it remembers the level of the previous mortgage
rate troughs it has experienced.
It is easy to fall into the trap of reducing prepayment modeling to fitting a bunch of
historical prepayment curves, sometimes even unconsciously. For instance, one may start
with a vague but not incorrect notion that a prepayment model is a multi-variate function of
time, market condition variables and loan attributes, then make a quantum leap to construct
such a multi-variate function numerically with essentially a multi-dimensional look-up table.
Various statistical methods can help the scarcity of loan data in certain regions of the multi-
dimensional variable space. But a look-up table, or anything of similar nature, violates both
constraints just discussed above and therefore is fundamentally wrong.
The knowledge about mortgages is never likely to be complete, if one remembers that
there is an indescribable human being behind each mortgage. There are always a lot of
unknowns. Consequently, mortgages in a cohort will always exhibit inhomogeneity. It is a
complex problem to construct a correct effective description of unknowns. It is even more
7
challenging to understand the interplay between the knowns and unknowns when some
unknowns become known. It is our hope to stimulate the study of this complex problem
by demonstrating that the collective effect of unknowns for the refinancing prepayments is
observable from the actual prepayment speeds in terms of an effective distribution of the
refinancing elbows.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we present an analysis of the
historical prepayment data for jumbo 30-year fixed rate mortgages. In Section III, we derive
the new refinancing model. In Section IV, we present calibration results. In Section V,
we describe the new burnout mechanism. In Section VI, we discuss the evolving burnout
effect in the pool-level to loan-level model transition. In Section VII, we discuss the effect of
burnout induced S-curve steepening on duration and convexity. In Section VIII, we discuss
the interplay between the knowns and unknowns. An analysis similar to Section II for the
30-year fixed rate FNCL pools is included in Appendix A to establish the generality of
the property exhibited by the jumbo mortgages that a cohort remembers the level of the
previous mortgage rate troughs.
II. REMEMBERING THE LEVEL OF THE PREVIOUS MORTGAGE RATE
TROUGHS
In this section, we present a detailed analysis of the historical prepayment speeds of the
prime jumbo 30-year fixed rate mortgages. In Appendix A, we shall confirm our findings
from the 30-year fixed rate FNCL pools.
Generally, a borrower exercises his refinancing option only if there is a financial gain.
While some borrowers exercise their options more efficiently than others, it is natural to
expect higher refinancing prepayments for higher incentives, everything else being equal.
However, it was discovered almost from day one in the study of agency pools that refinancing
prepayments of a seasoned pool are depressed by past refinancing exposure [4]. This is the
so-called burnout effect. An example of the burnout effect is shown in Figure 1. Due
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to the burnout effect, refinancing prepayments become interesting and challenging both
intellectually and practically because modeling refinancing prepayments is no longer a simple
proportional fitting of the historical prepayment speeds.
Current treatments [1,3,5–8] of the burnout effect are essentially based on an under-
standing [4] that can be derived from Figure 1. It has been recognized that some mortgages
within the cohort prepay faster than the others due to inhomogeneity. As the fast prepaying
mortgages are burned out, the remaining ones will prepay slower when future opportunities
arise. Now we show in the rest of this section that this understanding is at least incomplete.
Figure 2 shows four aggregated cohorts originated in 1998 with coupon bin width of
25 basis points. For the refinancing peak around December 2001, a cohort with a higher
coupon indeed prepaid faster than lower coupon cohorts. When mortgage rates fell to a new
low in late 2002 after an initial rise in early 2002, the order of refinancing peak height is
reversed for the three high coupon cohorts (green, yellow and pink curves in Figure 2). In
late 2002, the cohort represented by the pink curve has the highest peak, followed by the
yellow one. The peak of the green cohort is lower than the yellow one. This reversal of
the order of the refinancing peak heights took place even though the difference between the
cumulative prepayments of the three high coupon cohorts from the first refinancing peak
is relatively small, in comparison to Figure 1. Even the absolute magnitude of the largest
burnout measured by the area under the green curve over the period of the first refinancing
wave is mediocre. Yet the prepayment curves of the three high coupon cohorts crossed each
other before rising to the second refinancing peak around November 2002.
Figures 3 and 4 show the behavior of crossing prepayment curves similar to Figure 2
over the same time period for 1999 and 2001 vintage cohorts. Figure 5 also shows similar
behavior to Figure 2 for 2000 vintage cohorts but over a different time period, because
mortgages originated in 2000 tend to have high coupons. Thus, one can safely conclude that
the behavior of crossing prepayment curves exhibited in Figure 2 is not an exception.
One should note that the refinancing peaks around December 2001 in Figures 2–4 are
not very high by the standard of traditional treatments of the burnout effect for the crossing
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of the prepayment curves to take place. Figure 6 shows the actual prepayments of five 2002
vintage cohorts aggregated by origination date and coupon. The aggregation bin widths are
twelve months for the origination date and 25 basis points for the coupon. The center of
the coupon aggregation bins is indicated by the legends in Figure 6. One can see that even
though the 2003 refinancing peaks are giant, the prepayment curves do not cross each other
in Figure 6. Figures 7 and 8 show the same behavior of non-crossing prepayment curves for
2003 and 2004 vintage cohorts.
So what causes prepayment curves to cross each other in Figures 2–5 but not in Figures 6–
8? One difference is that in Figures 2–5 the mortgage rates fell to a new low at the time
of the second refinancing peak, as one can see in Figure 2. In contrast, the mortgage rates
after the first refinancing peak in Figures 6–8 did not fall below the previous trough. More
concurring evidence from FNCL pools will be presented in Appendix A.
Figure 9 shows the rate of prepayment increase per unit of mortgage rate decrease for
several cohorts from Figures 2–4, as well as the historical mortgage rate curve on the right
axis. The historical mortgage rates decrease almost linearly from May 2002 to November
2002. The rate of prepayment increase rises sharply around August 2002 when the mortgage
rate falls below the previous low, indicating that the cohorts remember the level of the
previous mortgage rate trough, or equivalently, the largest experienced refinancing incentive.
When a prepayment model is applied to cohorts of newly originated mortgages, an un-
known future mortgage rate scenario can have multiple troughs. The level of the first
mortgage rate trough may or may not be surpassed by the second trough. The prepayment
model should be able to distinguish these different scenarios. Furthermore, the level of the
first mortgage rate trough can be at any value of which the prepayment model should be
able to remember. If a prepayment model can remember any possible future mortgage rate,
the model must contain a continuous distribution of refinancing populations with different
refinancing incentive thresholds.
If a refinancing model has a continuous distribution of refinancing incentive thresholds,
then fresh refinancing populations suffered no previous burnout will participate in the refi-
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nancing prepayments when the mortgage rates fall below the previous low. The sharp rise
of the rate of prepayment increase corresponds to the activation of the fresh populations
suffered no previous burnout. This burnout mechanism is depicted in Figures 13a and 13b.
III. SELF-SELECTION REFINANCING MODEL
Let us consider a cohort of fixed rate mortgages of the same loan type, originated at time
t0 with average coupon c0. Each loan belonging to the cohort is described by a set of known
and unknown attributes. Let us assume that a loan with known attributes k and unknown
attributes u has a refinancing incentive threshold Ek,u. When mortgage rates fall so that the
incentive is above the threshold Ek,u, the financial gain is large enough that there is a finite
probability for the loan’s borrower to go through the hurdles to refinance. The refinancing
prepayment speed in the unit of percentage SMM (Single Month Mortality) for the cohort
at time ti measured in month is
P (ti) =
1
B(ti−1)
∑
k,u
bk,u(ti−1)pk,u(ti, t0, c0) θ [I(ti, c0)− Ek,u] , (1)
B(ti−1) =
∑
k,u
bk,u(ti−1), (2)
where ti−1 is the previous month of ti, bk,u(ti−1) is the balance of the loans with known and
unknown attributes k and u at time ti−1, pk,u(ti, t0, c0) is the refinancing probability for the
month ti, and I(ti, c0) is the refinancing incentive for the loans with coupon c0 at time ti.
I(ti, c0) is essentially a measure of market conditions. Obviously, B(ti−1) is the total balance
of the cohort at time ti−1. Finally, θ(x) is the step function
θ(x) =

1 x ≥ 0
0 x < 0.
(3)
Conceptually, the refinancing incentive I(ti, c0) can be considered as the ratio between the
gross coupon c0 of the loan and the prevailing mortgage rate at time ti with proper look-
back. In practice, the calculation of the incentive is more involved. But the details are
beyond the scope of this paper.
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It is conceivable that there are borrowers who will never refinance no matter how high is
the incentive. This feature has to be built into the model. In other words, we do not make
the assumption that the behavior of every borrower is financially rational. In the discussions
of the previous sections, we pointed out that there are always unknowns about mortgages.
The functional dependence of the incentive threshold Ek,u on the loan attributes is unknown.
As we have shown in Section II, what is important and observable is an effective measure of
unknown attributes manifested as a distribution of refinancing incentive thresholds. For this
purpose, we introduce a density function in terms of the refinancing incentive thresholds,
Dk(ti, ω) =
1
Bk(ti−1)
∑
u
bk,u(ti−1)δ(ω − Ek,u), (4)
Bk(ti−1) =
∑
u
bk,u(ti−1), (5)
where δ(x) is the Dirac function. Intuitively, it can be viewed as
δ(x) = lim
σ→0
1
σ
√
2pi
exp
(
− x
2
2σ2
)
. (6)
For borrowers with different refinancing thresholds, the refinancing intensity can be differ-
ent too. Let us define a cohort-level refinancing probability function also in terms of the
refinancing incentive thresholds,
pk(ti, ω, t0, c0) =
1
Dk(ti, ω)Bk(ti−1)
∑
u
bk,u(ti−1)pk,u(ti, t0, c0)δ(ω − Ek,u). (7)
We emphasize that the summation in equations (4) and (7) is only over the unknown loan
attributes u, reflecting the fact that only the unknowns are transformed into a distribution
of refinancing incentive thresholds.
Inserting the identity
∫ ∞
−∞
dω δ(ω − Ek,u) = 1, (8)
into equation (1), the refinancing prepayment of equation (1) can be written as,
P (ti) =
1
B(ti−1)
∫ ∞
−∞
dω θ [I(ti, c0)− ω]
∑
k,u
bk,u(ti−1)pk,u(ti, t0, c0)δ(ω − Ek,u). (9)
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With the help of equation (7), the last equation (9) can be recast as,
P (ti) =
1
B(ti−1)
∑
k
Bk(ti−1)Pk(ti), (10)
Pk(ti) =
∫ Eh(k)
El(k)
dω pk(ti, ω, t0, c0)Dk(ti, ω) θ [I(ti, c0)− ω] , (11)
where the actual integration range is introduced in equation (11). Pk(ti) represents the
prepayment speeds of a loan-level cohort with known loan attributes k. The lower limit
El(k) is the lowest incentive threshold of all loans in the cohort with the same known
attributes k,
El(k) = min
u
(Ek,u). (12)
The upper limit Eh(k) is not so straightforward. As we discussed earlier, there may be
borrowers who will never refinance. Consequently, the actual upper limit could be infinite.
In practice, we can impose a finite upper limit Eh(k) and use it to approximate all loans
with incentive thresholds higher than Eh(k). To allow for the fact that there are borrowers
who will never refinance, we require the refinancing probability function pk(ti, ω, t0, c0) to
fall to zero for ω at a value below Eh(k) and remain zero thereafter.
The burnout is a natural consequence of the inhomogeneity manifested by the existence
of a distribution of thresholds. In equation (1), the evolution of the refinancing populations
after participating in refinancing prepayments simply results from the weighting balance
bk,u(ti−1). Consequently,
Dk(ti+1, ω) = Dk(ti, ω)
[
1− p¯k(ti, ω, t0, c0)
100
]
, for ω ≤ I(ti, c0), (13)
where p¯k(ti, ω, t0, c0) is a seasonally adjusted refinancing probability function,
pk(ti, ω, t0, c0) = p¯k(ti, ω, t0, c0) Seas(ti). (14)
The seasonal adjustment coefficients Seas(ti) are just twelve numerical values, with one
for each month. By separating out the seasonal coefficients explicitly, the density function
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Dk(ti+1, ω) can be largely immune to the seasonal variation. The population density at any
time ti+1 is automatically normalized according to
Dk(ti+1, ω) −→ Dk(ti+1, ω)∫ Eh(k)
El(k)
dωDk(ti+1, ω)
. (15)
Equations (11) and (13) constitute our new self-selection refinancing model. It is derived
based on a single assumption of the existence of a refinancing incentive threshold for each
loan.
There are two important points we want to emphasize. First, equations (4) and (7)
express mathematically the notion discussed in Introduction that the unknown mortgage
attributes represented by u are transformed into the observable refinancing population den-
sity and probability functions in terms of the incentive threshold ω. The functional de-
pendence of the incentive threshold Ek,u itself on the mortgage attributes u probably will
never be known. In the practical sense, that dependence is not essential. What is important
is to determine the fairly unique population density at origination Dk(ti = 0, ω) and the
ω-dependence in the probability function p¯k(ti = 0, ω, t0, c0), both of which can be inferred
from the actual prepayment speeds. Only the population density at origination is deter-
mined by model parameters, because the population densities at later times are evolved
from the one at origination according to equation (13).
Secondly, the content of the known loan attributes k in equations (4) and (7) can be
changed by the way of cohort formation according to the practical need. By assigning some
mortgage attributes to the category of the known attributes and aggregating accordingly, one
can form cohorts with various degrees of loan-level characteristics. The self-selection model
derived in this section provides a unified and consistent approach to study the interplay
between the known and unknown mortgage attributes.
IV. APPLICATION TO PRIME JUMBO 30-YEAR FIXED RATE MORTGAGES
In this section, we present some calibration results of the application of the new refi-
nancing model to prime jumbo 30-year fixed rate mortgages. For cohorts mimicking agency
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pools, loans are aggregated by origination date and coupon only. All loan-level attributes
are averaged out. Thus, the label k for the known loan-level attributes in Equation (11)
represents an empty set for pool-level cohorts and will be dropped in this section. For
simplicity, we assume a factorized form for the refinancing probability function in equation
(11),
p(ti, ω, t0, c0) = q(ω)m(ti, t0, c0) Seas(ti). (16)
Equation (11) becomes
P (ti) = m(ti, t0, c0) Seas(ti)
∫ Eh
El
dω q(ω)D(ti, ω) θ [I(ti, c0)− ω] . (17)
The burnout equation (13) becomes
D(ti+1, ω) = D(ti, ω)
[
1− q(ω)m(ti, t0, c0)
100
]
, for ω ≤ I(ti, c0). (18)
This pool-level refinancing model given by equations (17) and (18) is described by paramet-
ric functions D(ω) = D(t0, ω), q(ω), and m(ti, t0, c0), apart from the seasonality coefficients.
The meanings are: D(ω) represents the population density distribution in terms of the refi-
nancing incentive thresholds at origination; q(ω) is the core refinancing probability function
for populations with different refinancing incentive thresholds; and m(ti, t0, c0) can be viewed
as an overall multiplier.
The probability multiplying function m(ti, t0, c0) is not the focus of this study. Its main
ingredients are widely known in the industry, including at least an aging ramp, a premium
origination effect (SATO effect) and a media effect (or publicity effect). For the model
results presented in this section, the commercially available multiplying function for the 30-
year fixed rate jumbo mortgages from Applied Financial Technology [1] is used. The media
effect for the 30-year fixed rate jumbo mortgages is weaker proportion-wise than for 30-year
fixed rate agency pools. Perhaps due to similar reasons, the effect of the positive housing
price appreciation is also weaker for jumbo mortgages than for agency pools. This is partly
the reason why we choose to present the results for the 30-year fixed rate jumbo mortgages.
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For simplicity, the probability multiplying function m(ti, t0, c0) used to generate the model
results throughout this paper has its housing price effect turned off. (This was the decision
of late 2007 and early 2008. The situation has been very different since late 2008. But the
subject of an updated prepayment model in a severe bear housing market and for a future
mortgage market emerging from credit crisis is beyond the scope of this paper.) Figure 10
shows the refinancing probability function q(ω) and the initial density function D(ω) for
the model calibrated to all 30-year fixed rate jumbo pool-level cohorts. Also shown is the
refinancing S-curve at origination defined as
S0(I) =
∫ Eh
El
dω q(ω)D(ω)θ (I − ω) . (19)
Both the probability function q(ω) and the initial density function D(ω) are independent of
the origination time t0.
Figures 11a to 11c show the model performance for three 2001 vintage cohorts aggregated
by origination year and gross coupon shown in Figure 4. The coupon bins are centered at
7.25, 7.5 and 7.75 respectively and the bin width is 25 basis points. Figures 11a to 11c
correspond to the case where the historical prepayment curves of different coupons cross
each other between the first and the second refinancing peaks in Figure 4.
Figures 12a to 12c show the model performance for three 2002 vintage cohorts shown in
Figure 6 with coupon bins centered at 6.0, 6.25 and 6.5 respectively. The coupon bin width
is also 25 basis points. This is the case where the historical prepayment curves of different
coupons do not cross each other between the first and the second refinancing peaks.
It may be helpful to point out that the pool-level model was calibrated against all
vintage-coupon cohorts created from all available 30-year fixed rate jumbo mortgages. The
calibration is not limited to the prepayment history shown in the graphs of this section.
Furthermore, the height of 2003 peaks in Figures 12a to 12c is affected by the refinancing
aging ramp which varies sporadically at the pool-level without detailed knowledge about
the pool composition. Nevertheless, better fitting to the historical prepayment speeds than
Figures 11a to 12c can be achieved by turning on the housing price effect and improving
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the treatment of the SATO effect. The latter point will be discussed in Appendix A where
the actual data indicates that the depression of refinancing prepayments by SATO effect is
uneven for refinancing populations with different incentive thresholds. But these subjects
are beyond the scope of this paper.
V. BURNOUT MECHANISM
It was pointed out in Section II that there is a crucial difference between the behavior of
the cohorts in Figures 6–8 and Figures 2–4. In the former case, a cohort with a higher coupon
always prepays faster than a lower coupon one during the successive refinancing waves. In
the latter case, some cohorts with lower coupons actually prepay faster than others with
higher coupons in the second refinancing wave. This is an intriguing phenomenon of the
burnout effect: higher incentives not necessarily lead to higher prepayments for seasoned
cohorts exposed to refinancing prepayments before. The prepayment curves of two cohorts
with different coupons may cross each other between successive refinancing peaks.
It is important to distinguish the mechanisms responsible for the crossing of the prepay-
ment curves of cohorts with different coupons between the traditional burnout models and
the new self-selection model. There are various treatments of the burnout effect reported in
literature [1,3,5–8], ranging from a simple depression of future refinancing prepayments by a
cumulative measure of past refinancing exposure (or past incentives) to complex distributions
of refinancing populations with different refinancing amplitudes. All these treatments ma-
nipulate the refinancing amplitudes of the populations introduced to capture the mortgage
inhomogeneity and are qualitatively the same. When this qualitatively same mechanism of
the existing treatments is applied to two seasoned cohorts with different coupons, the con-
dition for the crossing of the two prepayment curves between successive refinancing waves
only depends on the amount of cumulative burnout during the first refinancing wave. As
long as the cohort with a higher coupon is sufficiently burned out so that the remaining fast
prepaying populations are nearly depleted, its response during the second refinancing wave
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will be lower than the other lower coupon cohort.
The burnout mechanism in the self-selection model is completely different. What matters
most in the self-selection model is not the cumulative burnout in the first refinancing wave.
Instead, it is whether or not mortgage rates fall to new lows so that fresh populations with
higher refinancing incentive thresholds can participate in the second refinancing wave.
Figure 13a illustrates the situation when the mortgage rates do not fall below the trough
reached during the first refinancing wave. From equation (17), the refinancing prepay-
ments in the second refinancing wave for two cohorts with the same origination but different
coupons are,
P (t2) = Seas(t2)m(t2, t0, c)
∫
Blue
dω q(ω)D(t2, ω), (20)
P ′(t2) = Seas(t2)m(t2, t0, c′)
[∫
Blue
+
∫
Y ellow
]
dω q(ω)D′(t2, ω), (21)
where c and c′ are the coupons of the cohorts A and B respectively, with c < c′. In the
self-selection refinancing model, the population densities at origination for the two cohorts
are the same. At time t2 after the first refinancing wave, their population densities are no
longer the same and they are denoted by D(t2, ω) and D
′(t2, ω) respectively. The refinancing
prepayment P (t2) of cohort A has a contribution only from the blue area in the upper graph
of Figure 13a, while P ′(t2) of cohort B has contributions from the blue and yellow areas in
the lower graph. If neither cohort was originated at significant premium, both m(t2, t0, c)
and m(t2, t0, c
′) should not have much dependence on the coupons c and c′, leading to
m(t2, t0, c) ' m(t2, t0, c′). From Figure 13a, we observe that D(t2, ω) ' D′(t2, ω) in the blue
area. In other words, the burnout in the blue areas is about equal for both cohorts even
though cohort B produced higher prepayments during the first refinancing wave. In fact,
D(t2, ω) is slightly smaller than D
′(t2, ω) if the normalization effect given by equation (15)
is taken into account. Consequently, the contribution to P (t2) for cohort A from the blue
area is not higher than the corresponding contribution to P ′(t2) for cohort B. But P ′(t2)
has an extra contribution from the yellow area, therefore P ′(t2) > P (t2) is always true. In
other words, the cohort with a higher coupon will prepay faster than a lower coupon cohort
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in the second refinancing wave as long as the mortgage rates in the second refinancing wave
do not fall below the previous low, no matter how much burnout has been suffered by the
higher coupon cohort from the first refinancing wave.
Figure 13b illustrates the situation when the mortgage rates reach new lows in the
second refinancing wave. First of all, we observe that the contributions to the second wave
refinancing prepayments from the blue and pink areas are about equal for the two cohorts.
Cohort A with a lower coupon will prepay faster than cohort B with a higher coupon in the
second refinancing wave if
∫
Green
dω q(ω)D(t0, ω) >
∫
Green
dω q(ω)D′(t2, ω) +
∫
Orange
dω q(ω)D(t0, ω). (22)
The left side of the last equation corresponds to the contribution to the refinancing prepay-
ments of cohort A in the second wave from the green area in the upper graph of Figure 13b,
while the two terms on the right side of equation (22) correspond to the green and orange
areas in the lower graph for cohort B. We recall that D(t0, ω) represents the density at orig-
ination. Because the green area for cohort A and the orange area for cohort B in Figure 13b
have not participated in the first refinancing wave, the population densities in these areas re-
main roughly the same as at origination, up to the normalization effect. D′(t2, ω) represents
the density of cohort B after suffering burnout from the first refinancing wave. Generally
speaking, the condition in equation (22) can be satisfied only if the probability function q(ω)
is much lower in the orange region [I(t2), I
′(t2)] than in the green region [I(t1), I ′(t1)]. This
requires that the orange region [I(t2), I
′(t2)] be in the saturation area of the initial S-curve
(19). The crossing of the prepayment curves of the two cohorts with the same origination
but different coupons between successive refinancing peaks can occur only if the mortgage
rates in the second refinancing wave fall below the previous low. But having the mortgage
rates reaching a new low is not a sufficient condition. The incentives for the high coupon
cohort must be high enough in the second refinancing wave so that equation (22) is satisfied.
The shape of the density functions in Figures 13a and 13b is for illustration purpose only.
The area under the density function should always be normalized to one. The normalization
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will raise the solid curves on the right side of I(t1) and I
′(t1) above the corresponding dotted
curves. For the clarity of the illustration, the normalization effect is intentionally omitted
to emphasize the fact that the burnout from the first refinancing wave only depletes the
population densities below I(t1) and I
′(t1) respectively.
VI. BURNOUT IN POOL TO LOAN MODELS: A UNIFIED FORMULATION
A pool-level cohort of fixed rate mortgages from a given loan program is specified by its
origination date and average coupon. Because all other loan-level attributes are averaged out,
the symbol k in equation (4) denoting known loan-level attributes represents an empty set,
as in Section IV. When prepayment speeds are differentiated by more and more loan-level
attributes after being included in the aggregation criteria, a pool-level cohort is split into
numerous loan-level cohorts. For non-agency mortgages, the list of the loan-level attributes
represented by symbol k can contain, not exhaustively, coupon dispersion, average loan size,
loan to value, credit score, geographical region, documentation level, and debt to income
ratio etc. The self-selection model allows a uniform treatment across-the-board from pool-
level to loan-level models.
From equation (4), the relation between the pool-level population density function D(ω)
and the loan-level Dk(ω) is
D(ti, ω) =
1
B(ti−1)
∑
k,u
bk,u(ti−1)δ(ω − Ek,u) =
∑
k
Bk(ti−1)
B(ti−1)
Dk(ti, ω), (23)
El = min
k
(El(k)), (24)
where El is the refinancing threshold for the pool-level cohort and El(k) for the loan-level
cohorts defined in equation (12). Similarly, the relation between the pool-level and loan-level
refinancing probability functions follows from equation (7),
p(ti, ω, t0, c0) =
∑
k
Bk(ti−1)Dk(ti)
B(ti−1)D(ti)
pk(ti, ω, t0, c0). (25)
Equations (23) and (25) simply state that the pool-level population density and probability
functions result from averaging the loan-level ones. The practical need is actually opposite.
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One usually obtains a pool-level model first. So the practical problem is how to obtain
loan-level models from a pool-level model. Equations (23) and (25) provide the foundation
to arrive at loan-level models. One just needs to find loan-level modifications to the pool-
level population density and probability functions that are consistent with equations (23)
and (25). In principle, the pool-level population density and probability functions can be
modified in an infinite number of ways by the loan-level attributes. In practice, some simple
and straightforward modifications are likely to be enough for most purposes.
For the probability function, the simplest modification is an overall multiplier,
pk(ti, ω, t0, c0) = λk p(ti, ω, t0, c0). (26)
Sometimes, an incentive dependent (ω-dependent) multiplier to the probability function may
be needed, such as in the case of Figures 19a and 19b discussed in Appendix A. But our
scope here is limited to the simplest way of modifying the probability function.
For the population density function, an overall multiplier has no effect since the area
under the density function is always normalized to one. One simple way to modify the
density function is the well known ”elbow shift”,
El(k) = El + ∆k. (27)
Another simple way to modify the density function specific to the self-selection model is to
tilt the density function at origination,
Dk(ω) =
[
1 + (γk − 1) Eh − ω
Eh − El
]
D(ω). (28)
The tilt coefficient boosts the density function at El by a factor γk while holding the other
end at Eh unchanged. Because it is assumed that the density function Dk(ω) will always be
normalized first before being used in calculation, no attention was paid to the normalization
in equation (28).
Equations (26), (27), and (28) represent three simple ways to adjust a pool-level model
into loan-level models. They are the overall refinancing multiplier λk to the probability
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function, the elbow shift ∆k and tilt coefficient γk to the density function. It is helpful to
point out the difference between the elbow shift ∆k in equation (27) and the commonly
known elbow shift applied to the S-curve. In the former case of equation (27), the elbow
shift itself only adds or subtracts an extra contribution to the S-curve as one can see from
equation (19) by replacing El with El + ∆k. It does not shift the steeply rising part of the
S-curve horizontally. In the latter case of the usual elbow shift applied to the S-curve,
S0(I)→ S0(I + ∆k), (29)
the entire S-curve is shifted horizontally.
What distinguishes the loan-level models constructed from equations (26)–(28) from
the traditional ones in the literature is that the burnout effect is consistently built into
the construction of the self-selection model. Specifically, the differentiation of refinancing
prepayments by loan-level attributes is constructed in such a way that not only the differ-
entiation evolves with the mortgage age but also the dependence of the evolution on the
mortgage rate environment is consistently accounted for.
Due to correlations among the loan-level attributes represented by k, it is by no means
a simple task to calibrate loan-level models. Furthermore, when a pool-level cohort is split
into numerous loan-level cohorts, the quality of statistics is reduced. Consequently, more
sophisticated statistical methods may be needed. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
present a full-fledged loan-level model for jumbo mortgages. Instead, we would like to
conclude this section by presenting an example illustrating the dynamic nature of the loan-
level differentiation.
Figure 14 shows the actual prepayment speeds for three cohorts of different loan size
split from a 2002 vintage pool-level cohort with coupon centered at 6.25 previously shown in
Figures 6 and 12b. The prepayment model speeds from the pool-level model are also shown
for comparison. Figures 15a and 15b show the loan-level adjustments to the pool-level model
for capturing the loan size differentiation.
It is worth pointing out that Figure 14 corresponds to the case when the mortgage rates
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in the second refinancing wave in 2004 did not fall below the previous low in 2003. For
the other case of successive refinancing waves with mortgage rates reaching new lows, the
prepayment curves of the same vintage cohorts with the same average coupon but different
loan size can cross each other. This is the case for some 1998 and 1999 vintage cohorts. The
pattern is similar to Figures 2 and 3. The key point is that not only the loan size effect
evolves with the age but also the evolution depends on the mortgage rate environment.
Fortunately, the evolution of the differentiation of the refinancing prepayments by some
attributes like FICO score and geographical location are generally simpler than loan size
and less dependent on the encountered mortgage rate environment.
VII. EFFECT OF BURNOUT INDUCED S-CURVE STEEPENING ON
DURATION AND CONVEXITY
The self-selection refinancing model captures the inhomogeneity in borrowers’ refinancing
behavior through an effective distribution of refinancing incentive thresholds. This effective
distribution of incentive thresholds has very different consequences on duration and convex-
ity, in comparison to an effective distribution of refinancing amplitudes. The shape of the
S-curve evolves in a specific way as the consequence of the burnout effect, as opposed to an
across-the-board suppression of the S-curve when the inhomogeneity is represented by an
effective distribution of refinancing amplitudes.
To illustrate the effect of the evolving S-curve shape on duration and convexity, we have
chosen one TBA and two passthroughs from the July 2008 reports on OAS, duration and
convexity by Wall Street dealers to compare their durations and convexities. The three TBA
or passthroughs have the same net coupon but different age, being originated in the last three
years. Their historical prepayment speeds are obtained by aggregating the corresponding
FNCL pools and shown in Figure 16. It is clear from Figure 16 that both 2006 and 2007
vintage passthroughs have suffered burnout in early 2008. Figure 17 shows the evolving S-
curves as of July 2008 for the three aggregated cohorts in our calibrated Fannie 30-year fixed
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rate pool model. The 2008 vintage has not suffered much burnout and the S-curve depicts
its shape at origination. The steepening of the S-curves due to burnout is prominent and
unambiguous, since historical model fitting is very sensitive to the S-curve. As the S-curve
steepens, the behavior of seasoned premium cohorts will be shifted toward at-the-money ones
and the at-the-money cohorts will be shifted toward the discounts. This shifting behavior is
qualitatively different from the one expected from an across-the-board suppression of the S-
curve. If only the S-curve amplitude were suppressed by burnout, durations would generally
be lengthened due to a longer mortgage life span resulting from lower future prepayment
speeds and a reduced sensitivity to the mortgage rates in the mortgage spread duration.
For convexities, the effect of an across-the-board suppression of the S-curve would reduce
the magnitude of the convexity which is usually negative. In contrast, if the shape of the
S-curve is changed by burnout, the magnitude of the convexity is not always suppressed.
Figure 18 compares the convexities of three TBA or passthroughs as of July 2008 after
experiencing prepayments shown in Figure 16. The steepening of the S-curve leads to more
negative convexities for the 2006 and 2007 vintage passthroughs. The full consequences of
the burnout effect on seasoned cohorts need to be further investigated.
VIII. UNDERSTANDING THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE KNOWNS AND
UNKNOWNS
When a prepayment model is developed, it is usually calibrated against the history of
all available loans of the same type for better statistics. However, when a security is priced
or its risk matrix is calculated, only the loans in the collateral of the security are relevant.
It is natural to ask how one can ensure that a model calibrated against all available loans
is appropriate for the security? The question becomes even more challenging for loan-
level models since not only the prepayments of the security but also the evolution of the
composition of its known loan attributes can be different from the large set of all available
loans. The loan-level cohorts constructed from the large set of all available loans still exhibit
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strong burnout effect after the usually known loan-level attributes such as loan size, loan-
to-value, FICO, geography etc. have been treated separately. The effect of inhomogeneity
from unknown variables on the refinancing prepayments is still important and can vary from
security to security. The historical prepayment speeds of a large set of all available loans
of the same type only capture the average effect of unknown variables for the large set of
loans. For a given security, the effect of unknown variables for the underlying collateral
of the security may not fall around the average point on the spectrum of varying effects
of unknown variables. If so, the security will not be priced correctly without appropriate
security specific adjustment.
For a security whose collateral consists of newly originated loans, one has no way to know
whether or not the effects of unknown variables of the loans in the security are typical of the
large set of loans. In fact, it is not guaranteed that the behavior of these newly originated
loans will resemble the old vintages of the same type, even after the effect of changing market
conditions has been isolated and properly treated. One can only assume that the loans in
the collateral of the security will behave like the large set of older loans with similar average
loan-level characteristics.
For a security whose collateral consists of seasoned loans, the effect of unknown variables
of the security may be observable from their historical prepayment speeds, depending on
the amount of available history. Therefore, it may be possible to deduce the relative level
of the effects of unknown variables of the loans in the security on refinancing prepayments
as compared to the large set of loans. Intuitively, one can think of the large set of loans
as consisting of a fictitious series of securities with a distribution of the effects of unknown
variables. What is important is to determine the relative level of the effects of unknown
variables for the security among the fictitious series of securities. A simple extrapolation to
the future of the deviation of the past prepayments of the security from the large set of loans
generally will not produce correct security specific adjustment. The prepayment history of
the security is a manifestation of both the known and unknown loan variables.
A security is usually backed up by only a few thousand loans. The evolution of the
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composition of the known loan variables varies from security to security. For loan-level
prepayment models calibrated to the large set of loans, the differentiation of the prepayment
speeds by the known loan variables have already been determined. For the security whose
collateral consists of seasoned loans, the security specific adjustment should only contain the
discrepancy in the effects of unknown variables between the loans in the security and the
large set of loans. Thus, the correct security specific adjustment should be amount to the
would-be historical deviation of the prepayment speeds between the loans in the security
and the large set of loans, after excluding the effects of discrepant historical evolution of the
composition of the known loan variables.
Let us illustrate the interplay between the known and unknown variables with a simple
example of 30-year fixed rate jumbo mortgages. For simplicity, let us assume that the only
known loan-level variable is the FICO score and a loan-level model differentiating FICO
score has been calibrated against all 30-year fixed rate jumbo mortgages. Intuitively, one can
imagine that the loan-level model captures the behavior of cohorts aggregated by origination
date, coupon and FICO. Furthermore, one can conceptually assume that cohorts of the same
origination month are aggregated with very narrow bin widths for the coupon and FICO
score. The aggregated cohorts have very good statistics, since all available 30-year fixed
rate jumbo loans are used. For simplicity, let us further assume that the constituent loans
of the concerned security have the same origination month and the same narrow bin width
for the coupon as the aggregated cohorts from all 30-year fixed rate jumbo loans. But the
dispersion of the FICO scores for the constituent loans of the security is wide. If the loans
in the security historically prepaid faster than the corresponding large sample cohort with
the same origination month, coupon and the same average FICO score at origination, it
is not guaranteed that the same security will prepay faster in the future. Generally, loans
with higher FICO scores prepay faster than loans with lower FICO scores when everything
else is equal. If the security prepaid faster in the past by depleting more loans with higher
FICO scores, then the same security may actually prepay slower in the future. Both the
discrepancy in the inhomogeneity from unknown variables and the changing composition
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of the FICO scores in the collateral of the security contribute to the different historical
prepayment speeds between the security and the large set of loans. One has to separate
out the effect of the changing composition of the FICO scores in the historical prepayment
speeds of the security, with the help of the FICO score effect of the loan-level model, to
produce correct security specific adjustment.
The above example only highlights the problem conceptually. In reality, it is much more
complex. First, there are more than one loan-level variables. So one should think of the
FICO score in the above example as representing a collection of loan-level variables. Second,
the loan-level variables are correlated. Third, the loan-level models are effectively calibrated
against cohorts with finite aggregation widths for the coupon and other known loan-level
variables, and sometimes even with finite aggregation widths for the origination date. Thus,
both the discrepancy in the time evolution of the known loan-level variables and the differ-
ent distribution of the inhomogeneity from unknown variables contribute to the difference
in the actual prepayment speeds between the security and the large set of loans. The task
of finding a security specific adjustment is to exclude the effects of changing compositions
of the known variables from the deviation of the historical prepayment speeds between the
security and the large set of loans. This is a complex but practically very important problem.
With the birth of the self-selection refinancing model, it is possible to attack this problem
consistently because the dynamic burnout effect has been built into the model construc-
tion, as illustrated by the treatments of the pool-level to loan-level transition in Section VI.
The effects of unknown variables are transformed to an effective distribution of refinancing
incentive thresholds. The task of finding a security specific adjustment is to find appropri-
ate adjustments, similar to equations (26)–(28), to the refinancing population density and
probability functions of the generic loan-level model to capture solely the difference in the
effects of unknown variables, after excluding the discrepancy in the effects on refinancing
prepayments of changing compositions of the known loan variables between the security and
the large set of loans.
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IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented compelling evidence from historical prepayment data
that unavoidably leads us to a refinancing prepayment model with a continuous distribution
of refinancing incentive thresholds. We have derived the self-selection refinancing prepay-
ment model from the first principle, instead of preferentially choosing one from many possi-
ble formulations. We have presented selected results of the calibration for the 30-year fixed
rate jumbo mortgages to illustrate the new burnout mechanism of the self-selection model.
We have shown that the self-selection refinancing model with an effective distribution of
refinancing incentive thresholds is qualitatively different from models with effective distri-
butions of refinancing amplitudes. Furthermore, the self-selection model provides a unified
and consistent formulation to treat the evolving burnout effect from pool-level to loan-level
models, as well as the interplay between the known and unknown loan-level variables. It is
our hope that this paper will stimulate further rigorous researches on the challenging subject
of the interplay between the knowns and unknowns.
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APPENDIX A: REMEMBERING THE LEVEL OF THE PREVIOUS
MORTGAGE RATE TROUGHS: EVIDENCE FROM FNCL POOLS
When analyzing historical mortgage data, it is imperative to establish the generality
of any observed feature because there are so many unknown factors that can influence the
prepayments of certain mortgages. In this Appendix, we present our analysis of FNCL pools
to establish the generality of our findings of Section II, that mortgage cohorts remember the
level of the previous mortgage rate troughs and the cohorts’ behavior is qualitatively different
depending on whether or not the mortgage rates fall below the previous lows. All cohorts
presented in this Appendix are aggregated from FNCL pools with annual aggregation for
the origination date and 50 basis points for the net coupon.
First of all, we have confirmed that FNCL pools exhibit prepayment behavior similar
to Figures 2–8 over the same time period. We shall not repeat similar discussions here.
But FNCL pools have history extending back to 1980s. Starting from 1992, the decreasing
mortgage rates reached successive new lows, enabling FNCL pools to provide rich history
for analyzing the burnout effect.
Figures 19a to 19c show the actual prepayment speeds of 1988 vintage cohorts. The
monthly averages of the weekly Mortgage Banker Association survey rates for the 30-year
fixed rate mortgages are displayed in each figure with two month delay for an approximate
alignment between the prepayment speeds and the mortgage rates. Each figure is limited to
three prepayment curves for clarity. Various mortgage rate troughs are marked in Figure 19a
for references in later discussions. The prepayment curves cross each other throughout
Figures 19a to 19c and cohorts with lower coupons can prepay faster than higher coupon
cohorts after crossing, but only when mortgage rates fall below the previous lows.
Because of the wide range of coupons covered by the cohorts in Figures 19a to 19c,
the burnout effect is mingled with the so-called SATO effect. The fact that borrowers
were taking out mortgages with coupons significantly higher than the average mortgage
rate available at origination signals their challenging financial and credit conditions. SATO
29
effect depresses refinancing prepayments for mortgages originated at significant premium.
This effect is clearly seen for the yellow curve in Figure 19a where the area under the yellow
curve from 1991 to 1994 is significantly smaller than the other two curves. The depression
of the refinancing prepayments by SATO effect may be more severe at higher incentives,
as the yellow curve in Figure 19a seems to be depressed proportionally most for the lowest
mortgage rate troughs from November 1992 to December 1993. However, the difference
between the prepayment curves after 1995 becomes insignificant. As mortgages become
seasoned, SATO effect diminishes since the borrowers’ credit conditions improve and their
equity in the house builds up over time. The reduced refinancing response due to SATO effect
also leads to reduced burnout. The higher than expected difference between the 1996 and
1998 refinancing peaks may signal the curing effect for populations which did not participate
in earlier refinancing activities. The treatment of the interaction between SATO effect and
the burnout effect represented by a simple factorization assumption of equation (16) needs
to be examined thoroughly, especially for the loan-level models in which the contributions
of the known loan-level attributes to SATO effect must be identified and properly separated
out to avoid double counting.
Besides the crossing of prepayment curves, another goal of this Appendix is to establish
the generality of the property shown in Figure 9, which indicates that the prepayment speeds
increase much faster for the same amount of mortgage rate decrease when the mortgage rates
fall below the previous troughs. The steep rise of the rate of prepayment speed increase
occurs simultaneously for cohorts of various coupons so the effect cannot be attributed to
the shape of a particular portion of the refinancing S-curve. Another possible explanation
may be the coincidental onset of the media effect when the mortgage rates fall below the
previous lows. By analyzing FNCL pools from early 1990s when the historical mortgage rates
reached successive new lows with widely varying media effects, we argue that it requires too
much coincidence to attribute the universally observed steep rise, of the rate of prepayment
increase after the mortgage rates fall below the previous troughs, to the media effect.
Figure 20a shows the rate of prepayment increase per unit of mortgage rate decrease
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for the actual prepayments of the cohorts in Figure 19a. On their way to the trough in
February 1992, the mortgage rates fell below the previous low of April 1991 around October
1991 marked by the small circle on the mortgage rate curve in Figure 20a. The sharp rise
of the rate of prepayment increase is marked by the big circle in Figure 20a. From the
historical mortgage rates displayed in Figure 19a, one can see that the media effect is nearly
nonexistent around October 1991.
The calculation of the rate of prepayment increase requires aligning the prepayment
speed time series with the mortgage rate time series. In Figure 20a, the alignment is two
month delay for the mortgage rates. Since the alignment is a delicate issue, Figure 20b shows
the results for the alignment of three month delay for the mortgage rates. The qualitative
conclusion is independent of the alignment. The alignment was not a concern for Figure 9
where the mortgage rate decrease is almost linear.
Figures 21 and 22 show the steep rise of the rate of prepayment increase for the cohorts
in Figures 19a to 19c for the next two times when the historical mortgage rates fell below
the previous trough after the time period of Figure 20a. Figure 21 shows the steep rise of the
rate of prepayment increase for the actual prepayment speeds when the historical mortgage
rates fell below the previous trough marked by the arrow in Figure 19b. Figure 22 shows
the same feature at the time marked by the arrow in Figure 19c.
Figure 23 shows four aggregated cohorts of 1994 vintage FNCL pools, in order to further
establish the generality of the findings of Section II. The multiple crossings of the prepayment
curves and the richness of the burnout effect are vividly seen. Figure 24 shows the steep rise
of the rate of prepayment increase around the time marked by the arrow in Figure 23.
In summary, the rate of prepayment increase rises sharply when the mortgage rates fall
below the previous troughs. This is a general feature. It is observed in different products,
in cohorts of different vintages and different coupons, at different times. It cannot be at-
tributed to the shape of a particular portion of the refinancing S-curve. It is also unlike to
be attributable to the media effect which varies widely at different times in the examples
presented in this paper. Our interpretation relies on the existence of refinancing popula-
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tions with different incentive thresholds. The mechanism is illustrated by the diagrams in
Figures 13a and 13b. The inhomogeneity of mortgage cohorts results in the existence of re-
financing populations which are activated at different levels of refinancing incentives. When
the mortgage rates reach new lows, the previously sleeping populations suffered no burnout
start to participate in the refinancing prepayments, leading to the steep rise of the rate of
the prepayment increase.
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FIGURES
FIG. 1. An example illustrating the burnout effect as it is commonly known. The figure
shows the actual prepayment speeds of two cohorts of prime jumbo 30-year fixed rate mortgages
aggregated by the origination date and gross coupon. The aggregation bin widths are 12 months
and 50 basis points respectively. Both cohorts were originated nearly at money. The 2001 vintage
cohort has smaller refinancing peaks in 2003 and 2004 due to burnout even though its coupon is
higher than the other cohort.
FIG. 2. Crossing of the prepayment curves of 1998 vintage cohorts with different coupons when
mortgage rates reach a new low. The figure shows the actual prepayment speeds of four cohorts of
prime jumbo 30-year fixed rate mortgages originated in 1998 aggregated by the origination date and
gross coupon, with the aggregation bin widths of twelve months and 25 basis points respectively. For
the prepayment peaks around December 2001, higher incentives correspond to higher prepayments.
But three prepayment curves (green, yellow and pink) crossed each other before reaching November
2002 peak where higher incentives do not correspond to higher prepayments anymore. Also shown
in the figure on the right axis is the monthly average of the survey rates for 30-year fixed rate
mortgages from Mortgage Bankers Association. The mortgage rate curve is shifted by two months
to approximately align with the prepayment curves. For example, the all time low of mortgage
rates in June 2003 is shown at August 2003 in the figure.
FIG. 3. Crossing of the prepayment curves of 1999 vintage cohorts, similar to Figure 2.
FIG. 4. Crossing of the prepayment curves of 2001 vintage cohorts, similar to Figure 2.
FIG. 5. Crossing of the prepayment curves of 2000 vintage cohorts, similar to Figure 2. Due
to the high mortgage rates in year 2000, the 2000 vintages have higher coupons. The crossing of
the prepayment curves are seen between the peaks around May 2001 and December 2001, thus at
a different time from Figures 2–4.
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FIG. 6. Historical prepayment speeds of five aggregated cohorts of prime jumbo 30-year fixed
rate mortgages originated in 2002. The prepayment curves do not cross each other when mortgage
rates in 2004 did not fall below the previous low reached in 2003.
FIG. 7. No crossing of the prepayment curves of 2003 vintage cohorts, similar to Figure 6.
FIG. 8. No crossing of the prepayment curves of 2004 vintage cohorts, similar to Figure 6.
The minor crossing between the green and yellow curves near the end of year 2004 is deemed an
insignificant aberration.
FIG. 9. Remembering the level of the previous mortgage rate trough. This figure shows the rate
of prepayment increase per unit of mortgage rate decrease, i.e. −[P (ti)− P (ti−1)]/[r(t′i)− r(t′i−1)]
with t′ = t− 2, for aggregated cohorts shown in Figures 2–4. The thin dark blue curve marked by
the bottom legend represents the mortgage rates shifted by two months and uses the right vertical
axis. From May 2002 to November 2002, the mortgage rates decreased almost linearly and fell
below the previous trough of December 2001 around August 2002 when the curves representing
the rate of prepayment increase of the cohorts rise steeply.
FIG. 10. The refinancing probability function (yellow curve on the left axis), the initial popula-
tion density at origination (blue curve on the right axis), and the refinancing S-curve at origination
(red curve on the left axis) in terms of the refinancing incentives are shown for the model cali-
brated to the pool-level cohorts of the 30-year fixed rate prime jumbo mortgages. The shape of the
S-curve is naturally generated by the integral in equation (19). The new model parameters are two
parametric functions representing population density and refinancing probability. The undesirable
hyper-sensitivity of the model speeds with respect to the S-curve change in traditional models is
mitigated. The incentive can be conceptually viewed as the ratio between the coupon and the
30-year fixed mortgage rate. The area under the blue density curve is normalized to one.
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FIG. 11a. Comparison between model (red curve) and historical (blue curve) prepayment
speeds for a cohort in Figure 4, which is aggregated from prime jumbo 30-year fixed rate mortgages
originated in 2001 with a coupon bucket centered at 7.25. The coupon bin width is 25 basis points.
The green curve is the model housing turnover component in the total model prepayment speeds.
FIG. 11b. Model vs. actual prepayment speeds for another 2001 vintage cohort in Figure 4
with a coupon bucket centered at 7.5, similar to Figure 11a.
FIG. 11c. Model vs. actual prepayment speeds for another 2001 vintage cohort in Figure 4 with
a coupon bucket centered at 7.75, similar to Figure 11a.
FIG. 12a. Comparison between model (red curve) and historical (blue curve) prepayment
speeds for a cohort in Figure 6, which is aggregated from jumbo 30-year fixed rate mortgages
originated in 2002 with a coupon bucket centered at 6.0. The coupon bin width is 25 basis points.
The green curve is the model housing turnover component in the total model prepayment speeds.
FIG. 12b. Model vs. actual prepayment speeds for another 2002 vintage cohort in Figure 6
with a coupon bucket centered at 6.25, similar to Figure 12a.
FIG. 12c. Model vs. actual prepayment speeds for another 2002 vintage cohort in Figure 6 with
a coupon bucket centered at 6.5, similar to Figure 12a.
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FIG. 13a. Burnout mechanism in the self-selection refinancing model for the case when mort-
gage rates do not fall below the previous low. There are two graphs with each describing the
evolution of the refinancing population density of one cohort. The horizontal axis of the two
graphs are aligned. The cohorts encounter two refinancing waves at times t1 and t2 respectively.
The incentives for the two refinancing waves are I(t2) < I(t1) for cohort A and I ′(t2) < I ′(t1) for
cohort B. Since cohort B has a higher coupon, I ′(t1) > I(t1) and I ′(t2) > I(t2). The refinancing
population density at origination represented by the dotted curve in each graph is the same. After
the first refinancing wave, the population densities are reduced to the solid curves in both graphs
due to the burnout effect. For cohort A in the upper graph, only the populations represented
by the blue area under the density curve contribute to the second wave refinancing prepayments.
For cohort B in the lower graph, the contributing populations are from the blue and yellow areas.
Even though cohort B had higher refinancing prepayments during the first refinancing wave and
therefore suffered more burnout, the blue area is about the same as for cohort A. But cohort B
has an additional contribution to the second wave from the yellow area. Therefore, cohort B with
a higher coupon prepays faster in the second refinancing wave than cohort A with a lower coupon.
FIG. 13b. Burnout mechanism for the case when mortgage rates fall below the previous low.
The notations are the same as in Figure 13a. But in this case, I(t2) > I(t1) and I ′(t2) > I ′(t1).
The contributions to the second wave refinancing prepayments for cohort A come from the blue,
green and pink areas. For cohort B, the contributions come from the blue, green, pink and orange
areas. The contributions from the blue and pink areas are comparable for the two cohorts. The
contribution from the green area is higher for cohort A because it has not suffered burnout from
the first refinancing wave. But cohort B has an additional contribution from the orange area. If the
refinancing probability function p¯0(ω) in equation (17) is very small in the orange area, which is the
case when the incentive I ′(t2) is in the saturation area of the S-curve, the additional contribution
from the orange area may not be enough to compensate the reduced contribution from the green
area for cohort B. In this case, cohort A with a lower coupon prepays faster than cohort B with a
higher coupon in the second wave.
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FIG. 14. The actual prepayment speeds of three cohorts of different average loan size split from
a 2002 vintage pool-level cohort in Figure 12b with a coupon bucket centered at 6.25. The dashed
green line represents the pool-level model projections. Cohorts with higher average loan size have
noticeably higher prepayments for the 2003 peak. But majority of the differentiation disappears
in the 2004 peak.
FIG. 15a. Comparison of the loan size adjusted model against the actual prepayment speeds
for the cohort of the lowest loan size bucket in Figure 14. The pool model is also shown. The
2003 peak of the actual prepayment curve is lower than the pool model. But most differentiation
disappears in the 2004 peak.
FIG. 15b. Comparison of the loan size adjusted model against the actual prepayment speeds
for the cohort of the middle loan size bucket in Figure 14. The pool model is also shown. The 2003
peak of the actual prepayment curve is higher than the pool model. But its 2004 peak is lower
than the pool model.
FIG. 16. Historical prepayment speeds of three aggregated cohorts of 30-year fixed rate FNCL
pools corresponding to one TBA and two passthroughs of three different vintage years but with
the same 6.0% net coupon (slightly at premium as of July 2008) from dealers’ duration reports of
July 2008.
FIG. 17. Evolving S-curves as of July 2008 in the FNCL pool model for three aggregated
cohorts in Figure 16. Though most discussions of this paper are focused on the 30-year fixed rate
jumbo mortgages, the self-selection model has also been calibrated to the 30-year fixed rate FNCL
pools. The steepening of the S-curves due to burnout is easily spotted.
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FIG. 18. Convexities of one TBA and two passthroughs of three different vintages but with
the same 6.0% net coupon (slightly at premium as of July 2008) from dealers’ duration reports
of July 2008. The convexities are normalized by the 2008 vintage TBA for clarity. The curves
labeled ”Street Model 1 and 2” (blue and pink) represent the convexities from the dealers’ reports.
The self-selection model convexities (yellow curve) are calculated using AFT (Applied Financial
Technology) production two-factor short-rate interest rate model. Due to the steepening of the
S-curves, the convexities for the passthroughs of the 2006 and 2007 vintages become more nega-
tive. Because the convexity for the 2008 vintage TBA is also negative, the yellow curve for the
normalized convexities rises to above one at WALA values 11 and 23 months corresponding to the
two passthroughs of the 2007 and 2006 vintages respectively. The tendency depicted by the yellow
curve is robust and not much affected by which interest rate model is used.
FIG. 19a. Historical prepayment speeds of three yearly aggregated cohorts of FNCL pools
originated in 1988 with net coupon bin width of 50 basis points. The mortgage rates (MR), i.e. the
monthly averages of Mortgage Bankers Association survey rates for 30-year fixed rate mortgages
(MB30), are shown on the right axis. The various troughs of the mortgage rates relevant for
discussions in Appendix A are marked. The mortgage rate curve is shifted horizontally by two
months. For example, the first trough marked as April 1991 actually represents the mortgage rate
of February 1991. The yellow and red prepayment curves cross each other between the 1991 and
the first 1992 peaks, though the obvious SATO effect displayed by the yellow curve mingles with
the burnout effect. The 1991 peak for the blue curve is insignificant. Consequently, the blue curve
only crosses the red one between the second and the third peaks.
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FIG. 19b. Historical prepayment speeds of another three yearly aggregated cohorts of FNCL
pools originated in 1988, similar to Figure 19a. The 1991 peaks are too small for the curve crossing
between the 1991 and the first 1992 peaks to take place. While the crossing between the red
and blue curves takes place between the first and second peaks in 1992, the crossing between the
blue and green curves only takes place between the second 1992 and the first 1993 peaks. The
arrow marks the location where mortgage rates fall below the previous low before the second 1992
peak, to be further examined in Figure 21. The SATO effect displayed by the red curve is easily
noticed since the area under the red curve from 1991 to early 1995 is obviously smaller than other
curves. Furthermore, the depression of the red curve by SATO effect seems more severe around
the mortgage rate troughs from November 1992 to December 1993.
FIG. 19c. Historical prepayment speeds of three more yearly aggregated cohorts of FNCL pools
originated in 1988, similar to Figure 19a but with lower coupons. Because of lower coupons, the
crossing between the yellow and green curves only takes place between the two peaks in 1993 and
no obvious SATO effect is observed. The arrow marks the location where mortgage rates fall below
the previous low, to be further examined in Figure 22.
FIG. 20a. Evidence of cohorts of FNCL pools remembering the level of the previous mortgage
rate trough. This figure shows the rate of prepayment increase for 1988 vintage cohorts of FNCL
pools in Figure 19a, for establishing the generality of the property shown in Figure 9 for jumbo
mortgages. The legends denote the vintage year and net coupon. The rate of prepayment increase
per unit of mortgage rate decrease, i.e. −[P (ti) − P (ti−1)]/[r(t′i) − r(t′i−1)] with t′ = t − 2, rises
sharply after the mortgage rates fall below the previous low of April 1991.
FIG. 20b. Demonstration of the robustness of the property shown in Figure 20a, where the
alignment between the prepayment speeds and the mortgage rates is P (t) ↔ MR(t − 2). Since
the alignment is a delicate issue practically, this Figure shows that the conclusion of Figure 20a
stands unaffected if the alignment is changed to P (t)↔MR(t− 3) so that the rate of prepayment
increase is calculated as −[P (ti)− P (ti−1)]/[r(t′i)− r(t′i−1)] with t′ = t− 3.
39
FIG. 21. More evidence about remembering the level of the previous mortgage rate trough,
similar to Figures 9 and 20a. The legends denote the vintage year and net coupon. When mortgage
rates fall below the previous low marked by the arrow in Figure 19b, the rate of prepayment increase
per unit of mortgage rate decrease rises sharply.
FIG. 22. More evidence about remembering the level of the previous mortgage rate trough,
similar to Figures 9 and 20a. The legends denote the vintage year and net coupon. When mortgage
rates fall below the previous low marked by the arrow in Figure 19c, the rates of prepayment increase
per unit of mortgage rate decrease rise sharply.
FIG. 23. Historical prepayment speeds of four 1994 vintage cohorts of FNCL pools. The legends
denote the vintage year and net coupon. The richness of the burnout effect is vividly demonstrated
in this figure where numerous crossings of the prepayment curves take place at various times when
mortgage rates fall below previous lows. By the time when the mortgage rates reached the lowest
point of 1998, three high coupon cohorts (green, yellow and red curves) had reversed their order in
the height of refinancing peaks. But the refinancing peaks corresponding to the shallow mortgage
rate troughs of 1999 and 2000 had their order of refinancing peak heights restored to the normal
situation as in 1996, before starting to reverse the order again when the mortgage rates fell to low
troughs since late 2001. By 2003, the order of all four prepayment curves is completely reversed
as compared to the normal situation around March 1996. This behavior of reversing back and
forth the order of refinancing peak heights is consistent with the burnout mechanism depicted in
Figures 13a and 13b, but not explainable if the mortgage inhomogeneity results in a distribution
of refinancing amplitudes. The arrow marks the location where the mortgage rates fall below the
previous low, to be further examined in Figure 24.
FIG. 24. More evidence about remembering the level of the previous mortgage rate trough.
The legends denote the vintage year and net coupon. When mortgage rates fall below the previous
low marked by the arrow in Figure 23, the rate of prepayment increase per unit of mortgage rate
decrease rises sharply.
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Burnout of two cohorts originated at money
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Rate of Refi speed increase per unit of mortgage rate decrease
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Actual Prepay of Three FN 6.0 Passthroughs
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Fig 19a
FNCL 1988 Orig, Yearly Aggregates, Net=9.5, 10, 10.5
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FNCL 1988 Orig, Yearly Aggregates, Net=9, 9.5, 10
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FNCL 1988 Orig, Yearly Aggregates, Net=8.5, 9, 9.5
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Fig 22
FN 1994 Orig, Yearly Aggregates, 4 Net Coupons
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Fig. 24
Rate of Prepay Incr Per Unit of Mtg Rate Decr
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